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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RULON R. WEST, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
TERRY R. WEST 1and 
FLORA E. WEST, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9870 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
PLEkDINGS 
Plaintiff and appellant shall hereinafter he 
referred to as "Rulon". Defendant and respondents 
Terry West and Flora West will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as "Terry" 1and "Flora". 
"Ex." shall refer to Exhibit, "P", to para-
graph, and "R", to Record. 
Rulon's complaint in the first count sets forth 
verbatim paragraphs 6 and 12 of the partnership 
agreement between Rulon, Terry and Flora, R. 1, 
involving 1a motel operation called El Rancho enter-
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prises and hereinafter referred to as El Rancho. A 
copy of the agreement is attached to Rulon's com-
plaint, bearing the date, "October 19'57". P 6 of 
said agreement is as follows: 
6. ·The net profits of the business shall be 
divided between the partners in the following 
proportions: Rulon R. West, forty percent 
( 40 7o) ; Terry R. West, forty percent: ( 40 7o) ; 
and Flo~a E. West, ·twenty percent (207o); 
and the partners shall in like proportion bear 
all losses, including loss of capital. 
P 1'2 is as follows: 
12. If * * * the partnership shall be deter-
mined or expire during the joint lives of the 
partners, then the partnership shall he wound 
up, and the assets distributed in the propor-
tions set forth in paragraph 6 above hereof. 
Rulon's complaint a'lso has attached thereto 
Ex B, R 5, wherein the attorneys for Rulon in writ-
ing demanded a winding-up of partnership affairs 
and a distribution to be made to Rulon of 407o 
in accordance with P 6 !and 1'2 as pled in said com-
plaint. Said Ex B, R 5 over signature of Rulon's 
atorney, reading in part as follows: 
''Your partnership agreement provides that 
"if the partnership shall be determined or 
expire during the joint lives of the partners, 
then the partnership shall be wound up, and 
the assets distributed in the proportions set 
forth in paragraph 6 above hereof." Para-
graph 12. Paragraph 6 provides for a forty 
percent ( 40%) ·distribution to your father." 
( E·mphasis Supplied.) . 
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Terry filed an answer and counterclaim to 
Rulon's complaint in which Terry 1asserted that he 
entered into the partnership agreement in good 
faith and left school, gave up all other ambitions 
and endeavors in consideration of the promise of 
Rulon to make all ·capital investments and contribu-
tions with ·the understanding that should Rulon de-
cide to wind up affairs and force an involuntary 
winding up onto Terry, that 'Rulon would transfer 
to Terry 40 7o of all the capital investments and 
!advancements made and Rulon would have only 
407o of everything returned to him, R 14, ·p 2. 
·Terry also alleged in said answer and counter-
claim that pursuant to the notice of winding-up 
served upon him and identified as Ex B, R '5, at~ 
tached to -·Rulon's complaint, that T·erry entered 
into a dissolution agreement, which is 1attached to 
Terry's answer and counterclaim, identified as Ex 
2, R 19 to 2'2, and 'Terry also pled and attached to 
said answer and counterclaim, Ex 1, R 18. 
Ex 1, R 18 is pled and clrui'med as conclusive 
evidence of Rulon's carrying out his intention to 
take only 40% of everything or all interest in all 
assets . of El Rancho with the balance of all assets 
and all interest, 407o to gog to Terry ·and 20% 
to go to Flora. 
In said Ex 1, R 18, over Rulon's sign1a.ture, 
appears, 
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"1. The contribution made by Rulon R. West 
with respect to the 40ro interest acquired 
by 'Terry R. West was and is a gift from Rulon 
R. West and Rulon R. West does agree to 
file a gift .tax return in connection herewith 
so stating". Ex 1, R 18. 
"2. * * *" 
a3. iT'he undersigned, Rulon R. West, fur-
ther certifies that the interest in El Rancho 
enterprises were not only a gift to 'Terry R. 
West but :also to Flora E. West and their 
i~ter.ests were acquired by virtue of a gift. 
(Emphasis supplied)'. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this ·2nd day 
of April, 1960. · 
(S) Rulon R. West 
Terry also pled estoppel as against Rulon, al~ 
leging that Rulon was estopped ~to 1assert otherwise 
R 1'5, P 10. 
Flora filed her answer in which she alleged 
that she was entitled to 20ro of all assets and every-
thing, including contributions under and by virtue 
of 'P 12 as set out in plaintiff's pleadings R 1 and 
further that Rulon had so intended, ·should he force 
a winding up. See R 2·9, P 7. Flora further alleged 
that said 20 tjo was a transfer to her and was made 
conclusive under the agreement of April 2, 1960, 
which agreement is identified as R 18. See R 30, 
P 9 of her answer so !alleging. Flora also pled es-
stoppel, R 30. 
Rulon filed a reply to the answer and counter-
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claim of Terry wherein Rulon admitted the e:x:ecu-
tion of Ex 1, R 18 wherein it was asserted by 1Terry 
and Flora that it constituted conclusive evidence 
of a complete transf\er of 407o of everything and 
all interest to 'Terry :and 20% of everything to Flora, 
and Rulon raised as the ONLY defense to said Ex-
hibit, that it was without consideration. 
Rulon next moved the 'Court for a Summary 
Judgment, representing to the Court and alleging 
and specifying, 
"'There is no genuine issue of any m~aterial 
fact * * *". with respect to the issues in said first 
cause, see R 3'8, and that Rulon was entitled to 
judgment thereon as a matter of law. 
Terry, after the filing of the motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, but before hearing thereon, filed 
an affidavit under oath, alleging that the consent 
to the dissolution was entered into with reliance on 
the declaration that Rulon would have returned to 
him only 40.7o of everything in accordance with 
his letter of March 121, 19160, wherein Rulon agreed 
to take only 40 7o and Rulon having so pled. See 
R 44 for the Exhibit, :also R 5 and see R 40 to 44 
for 'Terry's ~affidavit. 'In said affidavit, Terry fur-
ther alleges that the dissolution was to be concluded 
with Rulon to get only 40 7o of everything as de-
clared in P 6 and 1'2 df ~the contract R 1 and the 
election R 15 to wind up made by Rulon in his at-
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torney's letter of March 21, 1960. 
Said affidavit further alleges that 'Terry en-
tered the partnership with the express understand-
ing that it was the intention of the partners that 
should Rulon force an involuntary winding-up onto 
Terry, that Rulon would receive back only said 
40 7o. Rulon did not either deny or put at issue said 
affidavit or object to the Court's receiving same in 
evidence. 
Counsel for Terry moved the Court that all 
depositions be published, which motion was granted 
by the Court R 107-12 and that all pleadings, ~affi­
davits, interrogatories and answers to interroga-
tories also be considered 'by the Court and received 
in to evidence, as well as all other pleadings, which 
motion was also granted R 110. Rulon's counsel 
made no objections to any pleadings, admissions, 
affidavits, exhibits or any objections of any kind. 
Rulon's counsel then moved the. Court for a 
Summary Judgment, wherein he admitted everything 
in the affidavit, since it was not denied, and he still 
represented to the Court that there was no genuine 
issue of any material fact with respect to the said 
first count, and he made no objections to pleadings 
or evidence or affidavit. The Court entered its judg-
ment R 110 to 112, resolving the issues in favor of 
Terry and Flora, which judgment constitutes the 
basis of this appeal. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FACTS 
'Terry changed all future plans and left all fu-
ture ambitions to go into a new field and operate 
El Rancho, the subJect of said partnership, and he 
did so for Rulon, :at Rulon's request and with the 
express understanding that Rulon would advance 
all capital and that Rulon could not at his whim 
and after sacrifice and change of position m!ade 
by ·Terry and when the business was built up, term-
inate 'Terry's interest in the partnership with ;Terry 
being thrown out of his occupation and forced to 
change position again, unles's Rulon's withdraWlal 
from all assets, including all capital contributions 
and advancements was made to be limited to only 
40% and lall of the 'balance, 40 7o to go to Terry 
and '20% to go to Flora. SeeR 1, P 6 and 12 where-
in Rulon himself has pled said contract ·so asserting. 
Moreover, this was part of Rulon's estate planning 
being carried out by his attorney's to avoid inherit-
lance taxes on a half million dollar estate. 
Terry, in good faith, went into and operated 
the motel. When Rulon elected to wind up, Rulon 
served notice that he elected to wind up in accord-
ance with P 12 by asserting in his letter drafted 
by his attorneys and identified as ·Ex "B", attached 
to Rulon's complaint R 5, wherein he claimed only 
40% was to be returned to him, moreover the sworn 
evidence before the Court which was not even con-
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tradicted or objected to was that Rulon supplied 
the capital and Terry gave up his future plans and 
all understood in order to protect Terry, 'Terry was 
to have said 40% distributed to him as indicated 
in P 12, R 1. See Terry's deposition page 21. The 
same attorney who drafted the notice for Rulon R 
5 also appeared and was present representing Rulon 
when Ex 1, R 18 was discussed and executed, where-
in Rulon made conclusive his intentions of with-
dr-awing only 407o, with the balance of everything 
40 7o to go to Terry and 20 7o to go to Flora. See 
R '101-20 for admissions by Rulon's counsel in this 
respect. 
ARGU'ME'NT 
POINT 'I 
·THE A1PPE:ULATE COURT WILL NOT REVERSE 
THE iiOWER COURT WHERE 'THERE IS SUF'Fl'CI-
ENT EVI'DENCE TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S 1POSI-
TION. 
'The fact that Rulon agreed to file a gift tax 
return, which was never denied, constituted an ad-
mission of a completed and executed gift and showed 
his intention on this issue conclusively. Since the 
above evidence 1and all other facts and pleadings re-
cied as considered by the eourt is not only suffi-
cient to sustain the Court's decision but conclusive 
on the issue, counsel deems it unnecessary to further 
e'lucidate the subject. 
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PO:rN·T II 
HAVING REPRESENTED 'TO THE COURT THAT 
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AND 
HAVING NO DENIAL TO THE AFFIDAVIT, EXHI-
BITS OR EVIDENCE AND MAKING NO OBJ·ECTTON 
TO HAVING SAME RE1CEIVED IN EVIUE1NCE, THE 
DOWER COURT WAS REQUIRED TO A:CGEPT ALL 
EVIDENCE AS TRUE AND RESOLVE THE ISSUES 
IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH. 
Justice Henroid, in the case of Lab co Gons·truc-
tion vs. Caldwell, 382 P. '2d 206 ____ U ____ , stated: 
"For this court to reverse the trial court un-
der such circumstances would deify a mock-
ery of our rules and pre-trial procedure". 
Counsel suggests that the Court consider the 
application of the same rationale to the case at 
bar, ~:nee after taking the position that there was 
no genuine issue of fact, and submitting the same 
to the Court, to then complain because the ruling 
was adverse is even worse than action taken in the 
~above-quoted case. 
Again this is so elementary and obvious, coun-
sel sees no necessity for citing further authorities 
in this respect. Moreover, counsel is estopped from 
asserting that certain facts may be in dispute when 
he himself represented to the Court that there were 
no facts in dispute. 
POINT II'I 
NEW MATTERS CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME IN THE APPELLATE COURT. 
The only defense pled or raised by Rulon to 
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the contract, the election to take only 407o and to 
the conclusive evidence set forth in Ex 1, R 18 and 
the 1affidavit was that Ex 18 was without consider-
ation. 
R 18 was executed and delivered to 'Terry in 
compliance with and to conform to P 6 and 12 of 
the contract as pled by Rulon R 1 and also conform-
ing to his election and notice to wind up and take 
only 407o of everything, R 5. Moreover, the part-
nership contract provided that 'Terry would under-
take operations with the understanding tha:t a trans-
fer of 40 7o of the entire interest to 'Terry and 20 7o 
to Flora of everything would be made by Rulon if 
an involuntary winding-up was forced on Terry. 
Rulon elected to force a winding-up and declared 
his intention to take only 407o of the entire inter-
est, and Ex 1, R 18 was executed and delivered to 
Terry wherein Rulon under advice o fhis attorney 
signed a statement that his 40 7o contributio nto 
El Rancho was a gift to Terry and Flora and he 
certifies 1thereto. All terms of the agreement R 6 
to 10 demonstrate ample consideration, as does the 
letter R 5 and election of Rulon to take only 40%; 
demonstrating Rulon's intent and understanding 
with respect to said P 6 and 12 of ~the contract. 
Moreover, when Rulon agreed to file a gift tax 
return, he conclusively demonstrated an unequiv-
acal intention that he intedned a gift and that :all 
10 
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acts had been accomplished to make ilt completely 
executed, completed and transferred. 
Even if Ex 1, R 18 had not been given in ful-
fillment of commitment and even la~ked 1aH the 
strength !and considerations of conforming to and 
completing the matter in accordance with the con-
tract P 6, 1'2, R 1 and the election R 5 and had the 
Court ignored all· of said evidence and ignored affi-
davits and 1all else, the Court would still have been 
compelled to resolve the issues as it did for the fol-
lowing reasons: The defense, by admrtting R 18 and 
by pleadings raising one issue only, and only one 
defense thereto, to-wit: no consideration with re-
spect toR 18, which is what counsel for Rulon did, 
the lower court must still be affirmed. 
NO CONSIDER.NTION IS NECESSARY: 
Reed vs. Knudson, 15 P. 2d at ·349 80 U. 4;28, 
"no consideration is necessary to support an 
executed gift". 
See also 24 Am. Jur. 758 ''5'3 Generally. It is 
a general rule that a completed gift inter 
vivos is irrevooable by the donor, his heirs, 
and personal representatives, and is not re-
voked by the property being mentioned in a 
will. A gi'ft inter vivos from parent to child, 
when fully executed, is irrevocable. A gift 
cannot be revoked on 'the ground that it was 
made under a mistake". 
Counsel in desperation not in pleadings or in 
evidence before the lower Court but for the first 
11 
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time before this Court asserts some impropriety in 
the execution of Ex 1, R 18, despite the :Dact 'that it 
was done in accordance with the requests made by 
Rulon's attorney in his estate planning program 
and drafted in compliance with the understanding 
with Rulon's attorney and discussed, considered and 
executed by Rulon at the requests of the !attorney 
of Rulon and in the presence of Terry, Rulon's at-
torney, and Terry's attorney R 101. Moreover, since 
impropriety of execution was not pled, it cannot 
now he raised for the first time in the Supreme 
Court, even if it were proper to raise such issue and 
even if there was some justification to 'be heard on 
said issue~ Here it has been demonstrated thlat even 
if such issue had been properly pled and considereq 
and even if the Supreme Court was to re-try the 
fact, which of course it cannot, still the issue must 
be resolved as it was, and 1the lower court affirmed. 
In bringing up King Lear and Santa Claus, 
appellant is deliberately trying to conceal the fact 
that in estate planning of Rulon's half million dollar 
estate, what was done by the firm representing 
Rulon !and appellant was proper, including the 
$80,000.00 'the daughters got in ·stock. 
ANSWER TO APPELLAN'T'S BRIEF 
The answer to Point I of Rulon's brief 48-8-37 
Utah Code Annotated, 1915'3,1 provided as follows: 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"In settling accounts between the partners 
after dissolution, the following rules shall be 
observed, SUBJECT TO ANY AGREEMENT 
TO THE CONTRARY." (Emphasis sup-
plied). 
The part to which emphasis is supplied is a 
complete answer to the point raised by appellant, 
since there have always been three agreements to 
the contrary: (First) P 6 and 12 of the contract 
R 1, (Second), notice and election of winding up 
R 5, ('Third), dissolution agreement and agreement 
of transfer of Rulon's interest by gift and promise 
to file gift tax return, making it conclusive, R 18. 
Moreover, P 12, R 1 would he surplusage and 
completely meaningless unless i't is considered as 
compelling Rulon to distribute, when winding up 
under said circumstances, 40ro to 'Terry and 20ro 
to Flora of all ,capital investments and advance-
ments. 
'Throughout the brief of the appellant, he refers 
to "'accountant Terry". We appreciate the fact that 
appellant has conceded the qualifications of Terry 
West in this field. The greater portion of the brief 
of appellant is an attempt on the part o'f counsel 
for appellant, Mr. Roe, to qualify himself as an !ac-
countant. 
"Accountant Terry" suggests that from an ac-
cou~ting standpoint, Mr. Roe, who is ndt an account-
ant, h!as demonstrated in his brief that he is not 
13 
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qualified to advise this Court on the subject for the 
following reasons. 
Appellant's argument that ''liabilities to part-
ners" includes contributions to capital is patently 
incongruous. Section 48-1-1'5 (UCA, 19'5'3) requires 
each partner to be "repaid his contributions" after 
"!all liabilities, including those to partners, are satis-
fied .... " If, "liabilities to partners" includes "con-
tributions" to capital, these contributions will be 
satisfied when the liabilities of the partnership are 
satisfied and 1there will be no ''contribution" left to 
he ·'·'repaid". Clearly, as used in Section 48-1-1'5, the 
expression "[liabilities] to partners" was used in 
its ordinlary sense of a debt liability such as that 
arising from money actually loaned as a creditor 
and not 1in the technical, legal sense of a contribu-
tion made by a partner as capital. 
1The position of !appellant that the money paid 
by Rulon was a loan is directly contrary to the pro-
hibition against such a position as made and pro-
vided for in the partnership contract itself, where-
in ~:rt states at 3B, R6, as follows: 
"3'B. Any further sums which any partner 
shall with the consent of the other from time 
to time contribute for capital purposes which 
shall be credited to his capital account." 
No evidence was before the Court showing any 
modification of said controlling accounting proce-
dure. 
14 
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By Appellant's own admission ·(Appellant's 
brief, p. 9), 1all sums contributed by any partner 
were in fact credited to his capital account. This 
procedure was strictly in accord with Partnership 
Article 3 (b) which requires that all contributions 
of a partner for capital purposes shall be credited 
to capital accounts. Such procedure was followed at 
all times prior to the Dissolution Agreement of 
April 2, 1960. Clearly, then, as understood by. the 
parties, the sums contributed were capital contri-
butions and not "loans" or "1advances". 
H'Owever, in an effort to bolster his argument 
for repayment of his so-called "loans" or "advances", 
Appellant urges that the sums he ''advanced" were 
bona fide "loans" to the partnership and thus Ap-
pellant qualifies as a creditor of the partnership, 
notwithstanding the fa~t that such a contention is 
contrary to the uniform practice of accounting by 
the partnership 1and the plain meaning of Partner-
ship Article 3 (b) . Obviously this is an attempt to 
bring such sums contributed by Rulon within the 
category of "liabilities to partners" as that term is 
used in UCA §48-1-3'7 since Appellant states [Ap-
pellant's brief, p. 34] that ''There is no reason to 
suppose that the parties meant to adopt a different 
meaning for "liabilities to partners". 
Unwittingly, no doubt, Appellant has cited to 
the court the precise reason why the parties could 
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not conceivably have intended to use those terms 
in the manner in which Appellant 'says they are 
used in the Utah Code. The Code sweepingly in-
cludes as liabilities of the partnership not only bona 
fide loans made by partners, which admittedly would 
be liabilities of the partnership, but also all capital 
and profit iaccoun ts. In other words, there never 
could be any ''net assets" as that term is used in the 
Agreement of April 2, 19'60, if Appellant''s con-
tention is correct. "Net assets" means assets re-
maining after payment of liabilities, and the logical 
conclusion of Appell!ant''s argument is that all cap-
ital and profit accounts would have to be closed 
as if they, too, were true liab'iHties of the partner-
ship. 
But clearly such an interpretation was not in-
tended by the parties since they expre~ssly stated 
that after '''pa~ing all partnership liabilities (in-
cluding liabilities to partners) , " the "net assets" 
should be di1stribu ted to the partners. By using the 
term "net assets", the parties obviously intended to 
confine the term "liabilities to partners" to the cus-
tomary accounting meaning of actual deht such 1a;s 
liab'ili ties to outsiders. 
Following Appellant's contention would require 
that Rulon's contributions to capital be deemed li-
abilities of the partnership in the same sen1se as 
liabilities to creditors, thus leaving nothing for the 
16 
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term "net assets" to act upon. Such an interprerta-
tion would render that term meaningless, notwith-
standing it is otherwise defined by dictionary, ac-
counting texts :and case law. In Kohler, A Dictionary 
for Accountants, 278 ( 195'2) the term "net 1assets" 
is defined as ''the excess of the book value of the 
assets of an accounting unit over its liabilities to 
O'utsiders." '(Emphasis added.) In Webster's Int. 
Dictionary 1·6'6, (2d ed., 19'53) net assets equals 
"the eX~cess of value of resources over liabilities to 
creditors as distinct from surplus which is in ex-
cess over all liabil~ties, including those to own-
ers." In Montgomery, Auditing 382 (8th ed. 
1H57), "capital" is used by accountants to de-
scribe the equity of an owner in a business and 
is represented by the excess of total assets over 
total liabiHtie~s which equals "net assets". In Com-
monwealth v. Union Trust Go., 34'5 Pa. 29'8, 27 
A.'2d 15, 18 (1'94'2), the court states, "1The amount 
of its net ·assets, constituting its capital, surplus 
and undivided profits, is a bookkeeping balance ob-
tained by substracting its liabilities from its gross 
assets; 'it is the shareholders' equity in the assets 
of the company." 'The court in Oram v. Kirchik, 58 
NYS.2d 431, 433 '('Sup.Ct. 1945) gave a 'simHar 
definition. 
Moreover, where a partner contributes capi~tal 
and leaves it in the partnership for use by the part-
17 
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nership in its business, such capital is not the same 
as an ordinary debt df the partnership. As was stated 
in Seaboard Surety Co. v. H &R Construction Corp. 
1'53 F.Supp. 641, 649 ( 195'7), "'This amount is due 
them not as an unpaid cred~tor hut as a return of 
capital." 
Although courts often speak of the return of 
capital 'as a debt of the partnership, it is in no sens,e 
a conventional liability of the partnership unless it 
is a 'bona fide loan or advance but is merely a dis-
tribution of capital among the partners according 
to a written agreement or understanding derived 
from the whole situation. See Hunter v. Allen, 14'7 
P.2d 21'3 (1'944). All of the Appellant's cases pur-
porting to show that there should be a return of cap-
ital are factually di'stinguished from the present 
case in which we have an express agreement de-
creeing the percentages in the distribution of capital 
upon dissolution, as well as a factual situation com-
pletely consistent with the written agreement. 
Furthermore, Appellant argues that Respon-
dent is bound by the Agreement of April 2, 1960. 
If Respondent is bound, so likewise is Appellant 
who must then abide by the plain meaning of that 
document a:s well 1as the dbvious understanding of 
the parties as evidenced by the accounting proce-
dures and practices prior to April 2, 19·60. 
Even assuming, arguendo, AppeHant's strained 
18 
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contention that '''liabilitie's to partners" include part-
ners' cap:i!tal and profit accounts, how does this help 
Appellant? He cannot take an expression out of con-
te~t from one of the agreements which supp1emen t 
the Articles of Partners11ip because it benefits his 
position, hut arbitrarily reject the remainder. If, 
therefore, the expression "lia:bil:ilties to partners" is 
to be accepted, so also should the provisions !adjust-
ing the capital accounts to reflect the transfer of 
capital from Rulon to Terry and 'Flora. Once this 
is done, it is immaterial whether Appellant's theory 
is adopted or not, since payment to partners will 
automatically he 'made on a 40-40-'20 basis because 
the adjusted capital accounts will be in that ratio. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. L. Schoenhals 
MARK, JOHNSON, 
SCHOENHALS & ROBERTS 
903 Kearns Bldg. 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defendants and Respondents 
HJ 
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courts proceed with i.E: : -u ascertain and :::tPV':f 
,.·. __ -~ - -~8 t~ undisput~d fact._'"i · _ -~ ·· i' lust ~,s t1esi~u -·l~ :1at _ ... _ 
0 · · ceed w1th equal dispatch to a~ ., ''iClpk:.; m c Ul 'i ' tc .: :w~L:J ! - __ 
, undisputed facts; and, since we fl~l rj,;_>,! t o p 'C\ : 1e <'_; __ y so·:1: 
"~' .() 1964'~a~on ~hy the Supreme Court s:wahi r !'-~ - ve in :,,nu d r1~J .tk \ . 
S\,. diStinCtiOn between law and l'QUlty a:'! Y.i:'· :~ a td " Sl'' tm· __ -y . l L~ ' 
~.L\&RA~~~,3.~e conclude that it neither· inttcndr oi t li!' ,_k - n, 
This is not to say that a court m.ust alw;~:,l· ~ r 
summary judgment in an action sef'~dn;,~ '':. 
.r c t l ' 
1L: n 
s 
, .J'J t. t, c 
~. LiE 
ly because there is no dispute as to il K~ f~:i(: 
seems inappropriate, the court can l't'lus;:' L~ 
might do after a trial. But if there are ,: .··~·· 2J · 
court believes equitable relief appropr·iat'f\ i .'. i~· 
to grant a motion for summary judgrru::nt 
eJr. ~h'V.£::1\: · . 
:· :lC . . _?lie{. 
§ 1233. Time for Motion 
As originally adopted, Rule 56(a} provh:~z:~;H H n. p,, , / S£:' ;_'l. 
ing to recover upon a claim, countf?'rda iw, (Yt _(:, ,_ et ... l c_,,. 
obtain a declaratory judgment might nto~/r· ,:; •! · r: · ., , ".::.: .. 
ment at any time aft~r a responsive pleading ·1·d ex· : . ;c; :> rJ~<-
Under this provision a pJaintiff could not ~rH ' • ~ .o - ·-~:;mLi' 
judgment until after tne. aeieii(fiU.if ·-r1·a;tr·~-.';--_f7~TI ·-'" ]''""~~·;~;"~~-~~~; .. 
pleading to the com2l~!!l.~ Where a defcr··r~:-~ tl' . ·.nn- ,_, : :r suL·· 
mary judgment before answer plaintiff cou~,J ,, 
ter motion for summary judgment untn ~-q h. ~·r ·),;; 
served.33 In an interpleader action one (k;f;;·.wlr! : n:.;Jr o 
for summary judgment until after the olh: 'l _::.ri ..:_ ;: _ 
swered their claim. 16 
By the amendment to Rule 56(a) the r,wnvh:i 
changed to allow a party seekiflg'to r{?COI!J,:• n· r.g 
31.21 J<~llas v. Manis, Tex.Clv.App. 33, Vlld"' '::. li"rn,·, v . 
1956, 292 S.W.2d 836, 838. .l'~ . Y. H~, ~-'1 , "· 
@ Declalona under former rule 
Begnaud v. White, C.A.Oth, 1948, 170 
F .2d 323. 
Peoples Bank v. Federal Re8erve 
Bank of Han Frands<'o, D .C.Cal. 
1944, 58 F.Supp. ~:-;. appeal dlH· 
missed Hi) F.211 KJO. 
U. S. v. Williams S. Gray & Co., D .C. 
N.Y.1945, 59 F .Snpp. ~>fl . 
Kent v. Hanlln, D.C.Pa.1040, 35 F. 
Supp. 836. 
;!I. k'P-1 '1 q ' >.;{, 
Pe :Jpk•3 ii :;.nd; 
ijtd ll ,1!. u!r 
Wl-l , ;· ,-! U" 
mlc::;t·: i 1\·:!·iJ· 
.34" H_ ~·'. ,'( 
.i !Jn, ·r n· r.;: • · !l•'!, 
116 
·d. ::<. 
h< ::, ~ 
il.i 
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i·ercia·n :--:::-- ::::-::-::.~=-=- ::. :=.3claratory judgment..!Q.. 
•novr · · summary judgment at any time after the expiration 
0 _ -~~ · "- vs · .. <:J1 the commencement of the action or after serv-~ll motiortf'Oi~ surririrtiryJ'U(fgffieil't~'by' the ad'verse ~party. 
Trw A/visory Committee Note states that this amendme!!l il.J.£. 
; IY' : n' res~ of more expeditious litigatior-: and that the 20 day 
r Nk·d o:l vrs a defendant time to secure counsel and determine 
'\mtlr ___ of actJOn_!U.i Such an mterval 1s unnecessary 1I detend-
<r:Jt -~:- "''···lf mo\es for summary judgment.35 Therefore a claim-
;; is no lmt~·r required to wait for a responsive pleading by 
1i:-: ad' crsary ~~yfore moving for sumn.:ary judgment. 
Apr-· - .galnst whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
;l~~srrtfr-1 or a dr-daratory judgment is sought may, under Rule 
~(~(b), rnnv::' for a summary judgment at any time.36 A defend-
ing m3.y make the motion at any time after a pleading stat-
ilg B. c · 'im a,gaanst him is served upon him. 31 A defendant is not 
;'pfmiru to ~He an answer before moving for summary judg-
ment _:~r the court may require a defendant to file an 
'i.i .. .,_- l.i:w!x ; his ~how>; a·n ex-
-·~,; .,f ,. -:11 i<tll- ll.1~'" a !liStilll!llii<lled 
, ·;til~·• .·;;r i\•i,;·i:-:or,r C<>l!ltnitft:>(' 
I 'ld" llii qff( ' !Jf. yPt UlllH'CPpt Pd--
JH•ars tllat no valid claim against hlrn 
exists. U. S. v. William ~. Gray & 
l'o., 1U'.X.Y.W-l:>, C.O F.Supp. f~.l3. 
i' e:t\ L' · trqm~t·n; if Hllynne C'ollld 38. Gifford v. Tran~]('rs l'rotpctiYf' 
P'.l'r sll<·'· lillY pn•,·ipitntP artion in 
:tit_\- lrHI c; • i! 11, off~~>t tlw Ill< IT'~> usual 
i,,t··'l'lllin ,::J,, d(•l:1,r~ But at a11y rate 
:; ... i'~'·" •ion i.-1 iwn~." Clark, The 
tlll>:w -Ttid;;;'llt>llf, 1952. :3f\ :\linn.L. 
I\ \ :i:\i 70. 
Ath •try { \nn.ndtt.et~ Nqff". Ap--
'·nillx, :lllll' :1.". For a nitil'isru 
lilr r; ::•y , LIP<f·d hy tht• 11rigiual 
i.;-,,,-;,-i·ni "I' dissn1tinr; opi11lon of 
''il'('l!l' ·" c,J;y ':t:c ;)!- \n r- S. v. AdlPr's 
~-l"Hill· 1'}. -r:.1'.A.2d JH:H}, 107 l<'.~d 
'
1\i7. H!l~. 
.ir-n: ' 11 ,- , onnson fi Co., D.C. 
!~:~ 1: :! ,-i'. :1 '' ~Hl 
{: rr.,rd v ''ra•' 'l'r: J"rotPdln• Ass'II 
()r ·\;: a. r:_,.~ .~.~-\.Uth, 1H·H·•, 10:.~ 
1'.2d ~·· " 
r. A dl'f< ndlrw; p11:r!y may mr'"" for 
· ., tr::r_j' _;,J•l\!,nir·nt ~1! :1ny tiJJH· ~tft•·r 
:• PI· a•;it1;: .' r·diJW a l'iaim again--:! hirn 
j~ l'I'VPd "''Hi !lim )f It !'IP:t! /,1 lip-
A~s·n of Amf•ri<'a C.C.A.!lth. 10-40, 
1~:3 F.2d ~OH_ 
Lind~PY \'. V>avy. C.f' .. \.f)th, l!H:>. 149 
l<'.:.!tl 8H9, certiorari dP!Ji•·d t;f; S. 
Ct. 331, 32G F.S, 7'-:;{, :1o L.Ed. 
474. 
MillPr v. International FrPig-lttillg 
CIJrp., D.C.;-\ Y. w.-, 1, fl7 F.S11pp. 
60. 
Sec11rity Trnst Co. of Rodtt•stt·r, N. 
Y., v. Woodward, Jl.( '.N.Y. lfl-17, 
73 F.Supp. GG7. 
Compare: On dPft>nd~nt'-; tn<ltion 
for summary jwlgtnPtJt, wltkh was (I}J. 
j!'ett·d to becaw--:1' no arr~\\'t•r l1nd hr·<-11 
filt•d, ddendnnt':; SIIPJI<Il'firr~ attid:tYit 
roul<l he considt>rt•d i11 plit<'l· ,,,- an-
tswer, or, it a fpnnal an.'-'\\'1'1' shrnrld 
he rPqnirPd, it rrlil!ht hf' fil•·d hy 
anrPtHltnl'flt at any tirrw, !'Vt•tr n ft Pr 
ftnal .i•rd_gment. l~. ~- ('X rt·l. Lan;:;ll-
lin , v. Eid1Pr, D.C D.C. Hl-li. :Jti F. 
Supp. !l72. 
] 1 i 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 sp<·citica 
1yrd tht· filinr, of such suit * * * was 
reliance IIP· lll the good faith of the ue-
i;t~iuns instituted hy and the assurances 
de by Mr. White through his attorney." 
e fllrq~oing statements are what this 
11 1·ss would testify to if this case went 
tri;11. Whether the jury would accept 
:h trstinHlil)' at its face value or reject 
is not the present question. Taking it 
its f:tce value on the motion for wm-
.ry judgmen t, it clearly puts in sharp 
ue thr defendant's claim that th( bank's 
uidators did not rely upon the repre• 
1tations and negotiations of White. 
filing suit before February 15, 19-l7 
wrote defendant on February 15, 19-l/ as 
to · the amount they would recommend to 
the Court as a settlement of the admitted 
debt, * • • " In the present state of the 
record this allegatiOn of fact has not Seen 
demed. If appellee desues to controvert 
th1s allegation of estoppel he can do so 
by filing his answer upon the remand of 
tiiTS- case, together with any other proper 
defenses ava1lable- to him. On the issui 
or-issues of fact th~7;ffiaae:tflePartfe'S7re 
entitled to their jury trial. 
Judgment of the District Court is re 
versed and the case remanded for further 
the proceedings in accordance with the views [6] The authorities indicate that 
hereinabove stated. 
al judge should be slow in passing upon 
motion for summary judgment which 
tuld deprive a party of hi5 righ,t to a trial 
jury where theror; is m td'l!onable indi~a­
n that a material fact is in dispute. Com-
re Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 
S. 620, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 LEd. %7, wh~re 
! affid;r.vits of eight witnesses on hthalf 
the dd~ndant ~ere, under the cireum-
nces in that Ca§~, insuffici<ent to author-
the Court to sustain ddendant's mo-
n for summary judgment" 
:1,8] T he fac~ that both parties make 
rtions for summuy judgment, and each 
ntends in suppoiii of his respective mo-
n that no genuine isstte of fact exists, 
es not require the Court to rule that no 
:t issue exists. I~ch, in support of his 
rn motion , may be willing to concede 
rtain con!cnt ions of his opponent, which 
ncession , however, is only for the pur-
se of th t~ pending rnotiuno If the mo-
n is overruled, the concession is no long-
effective. 1\ p-pdlants' concession that 
~enuine issue of fact exis~ed was made 
support of its own motion for summary 
igment. VJe do not think that the con-
;sion contin11es ov~ :r into the Court's sep-
lle conside ration of appelleers motion 
·summary judgment in his behalf after 
Je!lants' motion was overruled. M. 
~wer & Co. '!· Un ittd States, 7 Cir., 140 
.d 367• 369 ; Waltmg v. Richmond Screw 
Ichor Co., 2 Cir., 154 F..2u 780, 784. 
fhe co~plai nt stat~~ that the appellants, 
)mg on th~ negotnation~ and appellee's 
HICKMAN v. TAYLOR et al. 
No. 9579. 
United States Court ot Appeal1 
Third Circuit. 
Argued June 25, 194& 
Decided Oct. 18, 1948. 
I. Death ~95(2) 
In action by administrator for death 
of a seaman, as to which the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act was applicable no · 
recovery could be had for the economic 
value of the decedent's life for the ~riod 
of his probable life expectancy. Jones Act, 
46 U.S.C.A. § 688; Federal EmployeTs' 
Liability Act i§ l, 9, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51, 
59. 
2. s .. mln ~29(f) 
Where marine superintendent of rail-
road whose car float with freight cars on 
board sank in river, arranged for removal 
of cars from float by engaging tug owners 
to tow car float to shipyard and superin-
tendent merely assented to plan of tug OW'Q· 
er whereby tug was attached to hawser of 
sunken float during night and sunken float 
caused the tug to sink, railroad was not lia,.. 
ble f~r death of seaman on board tug. 
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y J5Lh & cable had been sent to Fern-
There then was quoted in full the 
i€' of May 15th, probably for the 
son, a~ contended by FAR, that it 
ld net bP certain that the May 15th 
til· had bern received by Fernseh. In 
1ciusion, th e cable stated: "Our di-
tors ha' l ' approved agreement (stop) 
.ail.iil.l! your answer." This cable in-
atl'd that the necessity of a confirm-
! ('able had bC'rn eliminated and that 
that was lacking -.vas Fernseh's ac-
J!ance. H seems clear that Ferm~eh 
O(' rs tood from the cable of May 28th 
~L p, cnnlirming cable from FAR \Vas 
lon~!'r necessary. Fernseh's cable of 
ne Jtl th stated: "We accept your of-
r in your ca ble of May 28, 1941. Con-
ler abrogation of existing agreements 
c1 mutual assignment of patents as 
ndinR"." A fair :reading of this cable 
ows that. F~~ :rnseh understood that the 
;t act n:·cesso.ry for consummating the 
ansaction had been done. Also on June 
th, Fernsrh cabled authority to Mr. 
artin (patent attorney and secretary 
FAR) to execute the formal assign-
ent on Fernseh's behalf. Fernseh 
ould hardly have put such power in 
AR's hancis had it not regarded the 
mtract as complete. It cannot be gain-
tirl that at this stage of the correspond-
lee such an interpretation was a rea-
mablr on e. Thus, the facts on and be-
ne June 14, 1941, demonstrate that no 
)nfirmatory cable from FAR was re-
uired to r.on~ummate the contract. 
This conclusion is supported by the 
ubsequen t ad.s and declarations of FAR 
nd Fernseh. Much argument was 
ressed, pre a"d con, on this point, both 
t the court ·:)e)ow and on this appeal. 
lowever, th if·. phase of the casr~ has 
•een dPalt with by Chief Judge Leahy so 
xtensively, artd with such particularity, 
hat no more need be said here than 
hal his opinion in this regard is adopted. 
(3) Defendant finally contends that it 
vas error for the court below to grant 
lUmrnary judgment in favor of FAR 
1ince there was a genuine issue of fact 
lS to the time when Fernseh's accept-
ance was sent. This contention is well 
founded. The general denials in defend-
ant's answer put this question of fact 
in issue. Moreover, it was brought to 
the attention of the court below when, 
at the hearing on the motions for sum-
mary judgment, defendant stated: 
"It is perfectly clear to me, Your 
Honor, and I think the plaintiff will 
have to concede it-that if the time 
when the cable was sent is signifi-
cant, there is an issue of fact as to 
that. And if the court must decide 
that question, then neither motion 
can be granted. We take a view of 
the case which suggests to us that 
the question need not be decided and 
that possibly, therefore, there is no 
issue of fact." 
F AR'e motion for summary judgment 
was premised on the theory that the 
correspondence between it and Fernseh 
demonstrated that an assignment was 
consummated upon the deposit by Fern-
seh of an acceptance cable with the Ger-
man cable office on June 14, 1941, prior 
to 1:10 P. M. (the effective date of the 
Executive Order). It was essential, 
therefore, to FAR's case that it be shown 
that Fernseh's acceptance was sent be-
fore 1:10 P . :M. on June 14, 1941. 
[ 4, 5] FAR argues on appeal, how-
ever, that there is not the slightest doubt 
but that Fernseh's June 14th cable was 
dispatched prior to 1:10 P. M. As 
"clearly proving, this contention FAR 
relies heavily on a detailed affidavit of 
an expert from RCA Communications, 
Inc. wherein the op£nion is rendered 
that the cable was transmitted before 
1:10 P. M. on June 14th. But, although 
an affidavit filed in support of a motion 
for summary judgment may be consid-
ered for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether an issue of fact is presented, 
it cannot be used as a basis for deciding 
the fact issue. Frederic Hart and Co. 
v. Recordgraph Corp., 3 Cir., 1948, 169 
F.2d 580. In addition, it is obvious 
from a reading of the affidavit that it 
_is nothing more than an opinion. Sum-
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88-i::Ed.1b J.S Other evidence is sim- mstrucuons t;O Ult:: lJlOH ·~" vv ... v w r- ·.'! 
ilarly pressed as substantiating this ceed in accordance with this opinion ... :I
point of FAR, but it is manifest that 
even when this evidence is considered, 
there remains considerable doubt as to 
the truth of the matter. The law is 
clear that one who moves for summary 
judgment has the burden of demonstrat-
ing that there is no genuine issue of 
fact. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Con-
solidated Fisheries Co., 3 Cir., 1951, 190 
F.2d 817. FAR has not met the burden 
here. 
(6] FAR also contends that since de-
fendant cross-moved for summary judg-
ment, it is now precluded from question-
ing the propriety of disposing of the 
case upon such a motion. But, it is 
well established that cross-motions for 
summary judgment do not warrant the 
trial court granting summary judgment 
unless one of the moving parties is en-
titled to judgment as a matter of law 
upon facts that are not genuinely dis-
puted. Walling v. Richmond Screw An-
chor Co., 2 Cir., 1946, 154 F .2d 780, cer-
tiorari denied, 1946, 328 U.S. 870, 66 S. 
Ct. 1383, 90 L.Ed. 1640; Begnaud v. 
White, 6 Cir., 1948, 170 F.2d 323; Lloyd 
v. United Liquors Corp., 6 Cir., 1953, 
203 F .2d 789, '794. 6 Moore, Federal 
Practice § 56.13 (2d ed. 1953).~ 
[7] In the instant case there was a 
genuine issue of fact as to the time when 
Fernseh1s cable was sent, and accord-
ingly the court beiow erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of FAR. 
3. It wu there held that affidavits of eight 
witnesses on behalf of the defendant were 
insuffif'ient to sustain defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. 
4. In Brgnanrl v. White, 6 Cir., 1948, 170 
F.2d 323, 327, the Court succinctly stat-
ed the applicable rule ns follows: 
''The fact that both parties make mo-
tions for summary judgment, and each 
contends in support of his respective mo· 
tion that no genuine issue of fact exists, 
does not require the Court to rule that 
no fact issue exists. Each, in support 
INTERSTATE NATU!RAL GAS CO. 
v. 
SOUTHERN CALIF011tNliA G.i\8 
CO. et at 
No. 13373. 
United States Court of Appeals 
Ninth Circuit. 
Dec. 29, 1953. I 
Action by natural gas compai . 
against another such company, alleged\ 
obligated to transport as a carrier naq 
ral gas belonging to plaintiff, for r~ 
fusal to so transport gas. The Unit~~· • 
States District Court for the Southe , 
District of California, Central Divisic' 
William M. Byrne, J., 103 F.Supp. 3lj 
entered order granting defendant's rr~ 
tion to dismiss, and plaintiff ap{Jeah1 
The Court of Appeals, Orr, Circd 
Judge, held, inter alia, that questions ~ 
to whether public convenience and r~ 
cessity required defendant to transp<:l 
thr?u~h its pi?elines gas belonging j · 
plambff, and If so, how much and ! 
what rates, and as to what fncilities '
1 
services should be abandoned to acco• 
modate plaintiff, were within the p 
mary jurisdiction of the Ft·deral Pov 1 
of his own motion, mnv he willing- to' 
concedl' ?ertnin r.ont.''·n.tiolls of his ot•JlO·~· 
nent, wh1ch ('t•li<'CHHlOil, howt'\'Pr, ix nnh 
for the purpu"c of th" JW!Hlin~ Hll>lr"J~ '1 
If the motion is O\'f'rrtlit>d, tliP cotH'PS· · 
sion is no longer cfr.-f'l ivP. A ll!ll'll:ints 
conCf';!Siou that no genuine iRH\11' of fael 
existc•l wns made in supJ>ort of itA owr 
motion for sumrnnry jndgntPnt. \YP d< 
DOt think that thP COTICPHHion ('OiltilliH'I 
over into the Court's fH'JlHrut•~ <'nn~idPr 
ation of appellee's motion for ~nmn 1 ttr' 
judgment in his lwhulf ufter uppellant~ 
motion was overruled." 
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y erroneous. 
the basis of fact in documentary form or 
in agreed statement of the parties does 
Glh ~idps moved for summary judg- not transmute such propositions into 
Th(• (·ourt granted motion for questions of law.3 l. 
11 t i'r , "':'<',e findings of fact, conclu- It is true that all the facts mi~ht ha\·e 
1:1 r·~· 1.1v. ?i1d ·entered judgment. The been stipulated. But even then, submis-
,; i·nc. n~· :nfrinJ.r ement and damages sion upon that basis would require a 
e ,wt :, Lji :d ica t ed . trial. At the trial an opportunity should 
L 21 T h· · t riRl court exceeded the be given to introduce evidence. Here, 
miss;hl c 1im its of ddermination of as we understand the record, there was 
q'o'\':-:' ;00 s \\'ithout trial. A mo- an effort to present some testimony 
1 fo r ~.J r; 1 ·nary jud).(mvnt cannot be which was precluded because it was in-
rtkd :1 im rtl :. because both sides move dicated the nature of a summary judg-
i li ~r ;ndisp ensable prerequisite ment prevents the trial of any issue of 
sut"h "" jwkment is the absence of a fact." No comment is required. The 
leri ;1.l Gt:t.s: io 11 of fa ct. But it is ob- case must be remanded for trial. 
us lh;,1t ~h : ! t> \\'~re postulates of fact [S-lO] But it should not be 
·oln-d :n u·, ': diametrically opposite po-
con-
ceived that this action is founded upon a 
technicality. The lawyers for the re-
spective parties, by the cross-motions, 
superinduced the idea that no factual 
questions were involved. But the ut-
most which can be said ill a patent \'alict-
ity case is that it is a "mixed question 
of law and fact." The implications of 
this phrase are misleading.a It is re-
alized that the learned trial judge took 
this action under the pressure of a heavy 
calendar and in order to save time for 
the parties and attorneys. As often 
happens, the shortcut did not accom-
plish the desired end.6 In a patt>nt case 
thf: re are three interested parties, the 
patent holder, the user of an accused de-
vice and the public. The interest of tht' 
ion5 t• f the i·esp ective litigants. Both 
1teni.-icne. of fact could not be true. 
[3-7] E :f.: then said the proof was 
:um ~ :1iary ?.·del was ail before the trial 
1rt. U ~J, :. s were conceded, there 
·re still q• J ~':-:i ion:; of f<tct to be resolved 
1ich ::.n <~PI~'·i l;tt e court is not permitted 
adjudicotc·. Trial de novo, which was 
rmeriy tiw rt.: le in admiralty , ecclesias-
:al cour t'l ar:rl in so me chan cery cases, 
defi :-ti t ci: <Jt olish ed in civil cases in 
e f.~ ·oe:?: ( 'C ~Pts ~JY th e rule~; constrict-
g re v1 ~~v:. J<i o a t-;l ho ri ty is given ex-
pt to Di~tri c:~ CouTt::~ tc. make new fmd-
~s of fact . ?n .. s ::nUy our 8ole fun<.:-
on a~ i~o :'lt".:b findi ngs if! to r e-examine 
Jdici ali;·. cri ,; •cize an d set aside if 
litJl .,c ;·: n t 
iR \\ •·II CRtab!i CJ hed tb u t 
: ' . r f!•t i tttll !HJ jud r, ment du 
· l 11 ~ t ri nl f'rJ nrt gnwting 
·'ltttlnt ''" i ''d >(' i!' ·Itt wdt•:-, :•. loll !' (Jf t hf! muv-
IIJK !':;~ ! ; 'P iro ;·ttitJ , d t11 jrtdgtll l: rtt 1!8 H 
mHt t •·.- < · , ~·; iJ"'" f :ll'l :; thai· Hre n11 t 
~~ · nq ;. ,. :· A. H . Li•i•ti,!Jiting 
1 'uqH· .,, ,; ,,. ·: l' r u•,; ,,. 1!. :\ C ir, : ~OB ~' . :!ri 
Jj;,, :1 •·; J: .. r:,·:. ud White,{) f)ir., 110 
F . ~d >~ ~:s. :;:.27. 
.\ fin ,Ji;!l£ ·t ~l ·. : ~: stwPnr.ry )• ,dgment will 
l11 · Ad •:y!·5 ~ if : ;:e re i ::~ ditm1 .: ~ »hont th o 
(; , •. t." v: :~ • ·r2 aftn trilll tbe cottrt 
1 1 ''l~lt :- • 'lit ~ .. ,-j,; ,.· we, d ' W>HJI!'! ,[ Ury HIJd te~· 
' '""' ' lt !n: ·. ~hr; ·-~ iH 11 Ht 1 1111,_; polir \ [()r 
. :dtirtlll > ~i··n 111: " •w·al, which iH cryHt a l!ilr.t ~ d 
In ll•tl•· ;-,:: . :•' r·· nal llules 1,( Civil l'ro-
l'•'dl!r• · :,: .-.: :·. ~~r .A. 
3. \\'aialua Agricultural Cotnp:111y v . ~lm.~·­
jll, 9 Cir., 178 }f.2d ()()::. tiOS. 
4. Federal Hult·H of Civil l 'ron:d•Jr,. , .-.~i \d) . 
5. A dearer statPtn~>nt h11s ht• (•n ~iv"n PI· 
dicially . "Tit•! qtt<•stion of in\·,.ution lwtt tt.; 
a que~:~tion of far·t, to l> e dPtPrmitlPd, ltll\1 
P\l'r, by ruiN~ of l11w . PoppPrrhlt~t'll \ . 
Falke, ~'1 · rl . ( 'n~ . No.ll:! .'-AI, !'; Blall-ltf. [Iii 1 
4Sl, we are t·nn!-itruined to hold the patPrtt 
vnlid on a fact finding of inHntion in it~ 
sul,j Prt matter.'' Radiator Speciality ( 'u . 
v . Ruhot, ~ ( ;ir., :m ~'.:.!d :li;l, :nn. At 
the tim~ of that opinion, th ere wus t ri:r 1 
de novo in uppcllate courts iu pat••r•t 
cases . 
6. S"P l>oP.hler Metal F'urnitnn~ Co., Inc., v. 
T'nitf•d States, 2 Cir., 14!1 V:2d 1:10. 1;::-•. 
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fallacious letters patent. 
parties pla intiff and defendant cannot be 
allowed to dictate the course of the liti-
gation lest t.he public suffer. 
[11, 12] Because of the peculiar 
character of the process of reconsidera-
tion bra court in a fteld where presump-
tion of validity of an administrative 
finding h:1s, to say the leaRt, been weak-
t>ned,s any tendency to abolish trial in 
patent cases for consideration of docu-
ments w camera should be curbed. Fur-
the rmore, apparPntly as a direct result of 
tht' impropel' failure to hold a trial, the 
fin d in ~' of fact whic-h were made were 
,.n; i rr!: inaJequate. H Pre again, the 
l:t'-V ',-•:· 2 '2 t-m to have preRented the court 
':,Jth f.,nrali :-:tic pr,moun c:ements of "ul-
timate fad ,'' ·which a re in effect concln -
!-:io n ~. An adrn :n ist rati''e g r z1r·t uf le · 
ter~ wr r-i ·c~ s >1 pr esumption o:· \'a! i it~ 
l: ut does not state on its f ace tne L '·en 
t.ion involved or differentiate the device 
from earlier patent or contrivances al-
ready dedicated to the public. 
[13, 14] The court must find facts 
which support three essentials: novelty, 
utility and invention. Mere conclusions 
1. "It is the public intr.r est which is 
dvm inant in the patent system." Mercoid 
Corporation v. Mid-Continent Investment 
Co., 320 TJ.K OG1, 665, 64 S.Ct. 268, 
:!71, 88 L.Ed. :: 46. 
8. See ~Iye rs v. Beall Pipe & Tank CorJIO· 
ration, D.C., 90 F .Supp. :..>f)5, 268. 
9. Conflicting views of appellate courts con· 
cerning the validity of the same patent 
l1as led tlw Supreme Court to grant cer-
t ,o rari in man.v cases. For example, 
~ e e Jnngerscn v. Ot>itlJy & Barton Co., 
·:: :i U-8. 5(i0 G9 S Ct ''G9 9'~ L .f'd 'J:J')· 
I 1 )'.1 \'l>emie~l Co. ·v. ii:llibu~to n. Oij \~· ~Ii 
1
.';,ru enting Co., 324 U .S. 320, f.l5 ~.Ct. 
G47, 89 L Ed. 973; Uui venm l Oi.l Product~t 
Co. v. G!obe Oil & R efining Co ., ~{ :''2 U.S. 
·Hl , 64 8 .Ct. 1110, 8A L.Ed. 13!>9; Cuno 
F:ngint~eriug Corporation v. Automatic 
Dcviees Corporation, iH4 U.S. 84, 62 S. 
Ct. :.n. 86 L.Ed. 58; Maytag Co. v. Hur-
a r~ C(~ n ta in I J j 11 lll! :' I i c ~ r :J ' ~ i ~ •. : I r" l Jot i 
~ 
ava il. No opinwn wa s hd.i ;f e t. h i:., Cc·urt. · 
There is ind1catiun n eith~r wh y t h •.· trial i 
judge thought the dr vic ,· Wil :i a 1; in ven-: 
tion !:or why t he pa k nl.{ d a l'ti •:k '>va :; 
diffe n -ntiated from t.he p1 wr a r c H is ; 
well known that a single rut ·:'nt rn s been ; 
upheld in one cilcuit and }~ t- ! d imalid in 
anothn.D In a fanlOLH .:aw, L1e Su-
preme Court held a pHt en t invalid 10 .1 
when attention wa" call ed to a device 
which ltad been in 1h r rnd· ic dom jn for ~ 
many years prior i o the :ll les-ed inven -
tion, alth ough it ha d r ~ rcvi,HJ:;.ly sus- ~ 
tained th e identic:tl pat ~·r ~ t ill ;:, prior ., · 
case where thi~:-: evid e r1c • ~ ul aJ1t. k "pation 
was lacking. In t.he inl2r e::; t of the pub-
lic, the impol'tanee of a s r)pcifk declara-
tion on the contested is s u~s br the trial ~. 
court eitlwr in op im.·o ll ;:: 1.· in fn ding:' : .. 1• 
ca nno t be overe mohas ized.n Otht' r - ~ 
. J. h . b d . 1 .. • h . ·-, ~ w~Is~ , L_ 1f' . ur .. en. 1s. p.taceu o r~ r.. l . -~ . t. o~ r .. :. ·1.· 
•)1 •• ryi!1~ pat e1• (. Ul 'S\~~ ' fi. the nn~c l!1- . 
stAnc E: rath er t:han exerc1s ing t he normal 
function of review. '! 
The summary judgmr n i: ia v::.c;:U·d, th;:.; 
petition for dedaratory .. ·eiief !2; rein-
stated and the cau:ie r emanded fo r trial ~ 
and appropriate and spcciik fin d ings of ···,j.•i 
fact. 
lc~· Machine Co., 3u·,- C .~; 24::s, 15!) KCt. 
Bm, 83 L.Ed. 126·1. See ubw 'I' : lnlett 
v. Lmvell, 297 U.S. o:~s. Yifi !i .Ct. 8·1:1, RO 
L.l~ci . 949. In &uch cnst~a I• e rfo rc e. t!w 
Supreme Court e :r e r (' i ~ed ·!n iud e pe:udent 
fn11ction in relt.1 ; i" "~ t r: i ,. ' : ~. 
10. Se.- Smith Y. Hnll. · ·:~)! -:; • ; . · 
Ct. 711, 81 L !·;d. lfH !J ,: ~ ,, 
Snow, 294 U.S 1 , r>!~ ~3 \' . ·Js .• z;, 
721. 
entuule inv-enti(ln ;" ~. Vl (, I) I~~" I. L ( ''~~I 
DOt lll Hrel y to ()J!:(liir•r:tft) th G dt ~: t'ltdnnt, 
but to relit ~\ e th•.J pul1l1C fr o111 a n 11 ss, · rt 1 ~ d 
lJ\ () flf> IHi ly • u." I!auY,h l')' ''· L 1·,·. 
151 U !::i . :O::H:.:!, ~ .'ii'i , 14 ~. Ct. :::: 1, ;c::!. 
38 L.l'id. 1H~. It iu iHq~t ~ ru ti\ e t hat ! hi' 
court·s do uot recPii' P. twlunilol ..: ion of Sl!< 'h 
coutrovers iPH on 1111 iuu d •• •p1 a t. 1· lt n:{i,1 lil id 
by intPr('~tecl partie~:. 
,. 
1 
, 
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